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ABSTRACT 
While there have been many variations in the experimental investigation of the public 
good dilemma, nearly all have shared the assumption that public goods (e.g., clean air or 
national security) are passively/automatically consumed by actors in the real world. As a 
consequence, in the standard experimental design, the public good is automatically 
redistributed to all group members, regardless of whether (or how much) each 
contributed to its provision. Here, I suggest that the automatic distribution of benefits 
design, in which each group member passively receives his or her share of the public 
good, systematically under-represents many real world public goods which must be 
actively consumed   in   order   to   benefit   (e.g.,   NPR,   public   parks,   clean   water,   or   ‘open  
content’  such  as  Wikipedia).  My  ‘shadow  of  consumption’ hypothesis states that actively 
consumed public goods are more likely to be provided than those that are passively 
consumed. Specifically, I propose that actors who anticipate the active consumption of a 
public good will contribute significantly more to its provision than those who anticipate 
automatic distribution or passive consumption, as is the case in the standard public goods 
design. The results of a new experiment fully support my hypothesis. Actors contributed 
significantly more to the public good when they anticipated an active consumption 
decision than when they expected that the public good would be automatically 
redistributed. These results suggest that because it does not account for how anticipated 
use drives contribution, the standard public goods design might systematically 
overestimate the level of free-riding that occurs in the provision of many public goods. 
vi 
 
Another   implication  of   the  ‘shadow  of  consumption’  hypothesis   is   that,  all  other   things  
equal, public goods that must be actively consumed will be provided at higher levels than 
those that are passively consumed. 
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PREFACE 
"I like the Walrus best," said Alice, "because you see he was a little sorry for the poor 
oysters." "He ate more than the Carpenter, though," said Tweedledee.  
"You see he held his handkerchief in front, so that the Carpenter couldn't count how 
many he took: contrariwise." "That was mean!" Alice said indignantly.  
"Then I like the Carpenter best—if he didn't eat so many as the Walrus."  
"But he ate as many as he could get," said Tweedledum. This was a puzzler. After a 
pause, Alice began, "Well! They were both very unpleasant characters—". 
        Lewis  Carroll,  “Through  the  Looking-Glass,  and  what  Alice  found  there”  (1871) 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the great puzzles of sociology, psychology, economics, and many other 
disciplines, is why, how, and under which conditions human actors overcome conflicts of 
narrow self-interest to achieve collective action - “possibly  only  the  topics  of  God,  love,  
and inner  struggle  have  received  comparable  attention.”  (Luce  and  Raiffa  1989  [1957]:1)   
 Members of many groups face the problem of a pervasive tension between 
individual and collective rationality (Messick and Brewer 1983): although the entire 
group would benefit most from mutual cooperation and the provision of a collective 
good, every actor is also tempted to free ride on the costly contributions of his/her fellow 
group members (Dawes 1980). However, if nobody contributes, the good will not be 
provided, nobody benefits and all will be worse off. The free rider problem (Olson 1965) 
jeopardizes collective action and remains a fundamental challenge for humans all around 
the globe (UNDP 1999; van Lange 2008.)                                                             
 And   “[y]et,   people   do   overcome   the   collective   action   problem;;   society   is  
possible”1 (Willer 2009:23). Proposed solutions to the puzzle of how Public Goods2 are 
provided have come from sociology (Willer 2009), political science (Ostrom 1990), 
social psychology (van Vugt 2009), economics (Gintis et al. 2005), and many other fields 
                                                          
1 “Let  me  start  with  a  provocative  statement.  You  would not be reading this article if it were not for some of our 
ancestors  learning  how  to  undertake  collective  action  to  solve  social  dilemmas”  (Ostrom  1998:1).   
 
2 The focus of this paper is the Dilemma of Public Goods. For a comparison between public good and Common 
Resource Pool Dilemmas see Apesteguia and Maier-Rigaud (2006), Ostrom (2003) or Sell and Son (1997). 
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(overviews in Hardin 1982; Kollock 1998; Komorita and Parks 1996; Ledyard 1995; 
Oliver 1993; Ostrom 1998; Udehn 1993; van Lange et al. 2013).3 Despite many 
variations on the standard design in public goods experiments, nearly all of them have 
shared a fundamental feature: the public good is automatically redistributed to all group 
members, regardless of whether or how much each contributed to its provision.  
 Here, I suggest that the automatic distribution of benefits design, in which each 
group member passively consumes his or her share of the public good, systematically 
overestimates the level of free-riding that occurs in many real world groups. That is, 
while some public goods (e.g., clean air, national security) are passively consumed, many 
others   (e.g.,   public   radio  or   television,  public  parks   and  gardens,   clean  water,   or   ‘open  
content’   materials   such   as   Wikipedia)   must   be   actively   consumed:   although   no   one  
person can be excluded, each must make a decision about whether (or how often) to tune 
in to NPR, walk or picnic in a park, or use Wikipedia.4     
 I introduce the shadow of consumption hypothesis to explain why public goods 
that must be actively consumed are more likely to be provided than those that are 
passively consumed. Specifically, I argue that an actor who anticipates the active 
consumption of a public good will contribute significantly more to its provision than an 
actor who anticipates automatic distribution or passive consumption, as is the case in the 
standard public goods design.                    
                                                          
3 More recent approaches to the collective action problem include descriptive norms of cooperation (Cialdini 
2006; Irwin and Simpson 2013), peer sanctioning (Fehr and Gaechter 2002; Eriksson et al. 2013), the legitimacy 
and centrality of sanctioning authorities (Baldassarri and Grossman 2011), hierarchical models of organization 
(Halevy et al. 2011), status differentiation within groups (Willer 2009; Simpson et al. 2012), and moral 
judgments of and by group members (Simpson et al. 2013). 
 
4 Note that the present research is mainly concerned with the way benefits of public goods are consumed 
(passively vs. actively), rather than the extent to which these benefits are shared equally or not.  
3 
I claim that the passive consumption of many Public Goods resembles inaction/omission, 
while active consumption of many other Public Goods is analogous to action/commission 
(de Scioli et al. 2011).         
 I build upon social psychological research which has shown that commissions are 
attributed higher levels of responsibility and intentionality, elicit more affective reactions, 
and are subject to much harsher moral judgments and scrutiny than omissions, even if 
they lead to the very same outcomes (Baron and Ritov 2004; de Scioli et al. 2011; 
Kordes-de Vaal 1996; Malle and Bennet 2002; Spranca et al. 1991; Zeelenberg et al. 
2000). I thus suggest that in active public good settings (where the benefit must be 
actively consumed) self-serving actors will not only more likely be detected and 
identified as free riders than in passive settings (where the benefit is automatically 
received), but will also elicit more negative emotions and moral judgments of other group 
members. I conclude that free riding in active public good settings is less likely to occur 
than in passive settings and predict significantly higher cooperation rates for the actively 
consumed public goods.                                                    
 I tested this and other hypotheses against the results of a first experimental study. 
The   results   fully   support   my   main   ‘shadow   of   consumption’   hypothesis:   actors  
contributed significantly more to the public good when they anticipated an active 
consumption decision than when they expected that the public good would be 
automatically redistributed. My thesis is organized in the following way. First, I will give 
a brief overview of the Public Good Dilemma. I identify  ‘passive  consumption’  of  Public  
Goods as an implicit, yet ubiquitous feature of all experimental studies of Public Goods. 
After introducing active consumption as a distinctly different consumption type of public 
4 
 
goods, I outline my theoretical argument at greater detail, and derive hypotheses. Finally, 
I present the results of a first experimental test using an active consumption design, 
discuss several possible implications of my research, and conclude with suggestions for 
future work.  
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND 
2.1 PUBLIC GOODS AND SOCIAL DILEMMAS 
The provision of Public Goods always contains Social Dilemmas. These dilemmas are 
brought about by an interplay of certain structural features all Public Goods share 
(infeasability of exclusion and jointness of supply/consumption) as well as the 
generalized assumption of narrowly rational/self-interested actors. Once created, all 
actors   have   equal   access   to   a   public   good’s   resources   and   cannot   be   excluded   from  
equally  benefitting  “regardless  of  whether  they  have  helped  provide  the  good”  (Kollock  
1998:188).           
 For example, even though some people might have not donated to National Public 
Radio (NPR) they cannot be excluded from benefitting from its programming. Likewise, 
“if   the   law   says   that wage rates in a factory must be uniform for each job category, 
nonunion workers cannot easily be excluded from enjoying the benefits of union-
negotiated  wage  increases.”  (Hardin  1982:19-20) Furthermore, the benefit of some actors 
does not preclude the benefitting  of  others:  “Jointness  means  that   the  utility  one  person  
derives   from   a   good   does   not   diminish   as   a   result   of   its   use   by   other   people”   (Udehn  
1993:241). Hundreds of thousands having tuned in to NPR will not prohibit others others 
from listening to the station. Likewise, once a wage increase has been successfully 
negotiated  by  a  union,  “it  benefits  all  the  relevant  workers  so  that  one  worker’s  receipt  of  
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the  higher  rate  does  not  reduce  the  rate  available  to  others.”  5 (Hardin 1982:19)                              
 One  of  rational  choice  theory’s  main  axioms  states  that  actors  will  always  act  to  
maximize their expected utility by maximizing own payoffs while minimizing personal 
losses (Luce and Raiffa 1989[1957]; von Neumann and Morgenstern 2004[1944]). 
“Though  all  of  the  members  of  the  group  therefore  have  a  common  interest  in  obtaining  
this collective benefit, they have no common interest in paying the cost of providing that 
collective good. Each would prefer that the others pay the entire cost, and ordinarily 
would   get   any   benefit   provided  whether   he   had   borne   part   of   the   cost   or   not.”   (Olson  
1965:21)                                  
 The resulting social dilemma, also known as the Public Good Dilemma, has 
commonly been framed as a N-Person Prisoner’s   Dilemma   (Taylor   1987):   Although  
universal cooperation is the pareto-optimal (but unstable) solution for the entire 
collective, games are predicted to approach the pareto-inferior (yet stable)6 Nash-
Equilibrium (Nash 1957) of universal defection because each actor gains the maximum 
payoff  by  defecting  and  “free  riding”  (Olson  1965:76)  on  the  cooperation  of  all  others.   
 Hence, “a   rational   egoist   in   a   public   good   game   (...)   should   not   in   any  way   be  
affected by a belief regarding the contribution levels of others. The dominant strategy is 
zero  contribution,  no  matter  what  others  do.”   (Ostrom  2000:140)  This   strong free rider 
                                                          
5 “Few,   if   any,   joint   consumption   goods   are  perfectly   nonsubtractible.  The  use   and   enjoyment   of   gravity   as   a  
force which firmly keeps out feet on the ground may illustrate the case of perfect nonsubtractibility, but most 
joint consumption goods are instead subject to partial subtractibility. At certain thresholds of supply, one 
person's   use   of   a   good   subtracts   in   part   from   its   use   and   enjoyment   by   others.   Congestion   begins   to   occur.”  
(Ostrom   and  Ostrom   1999:77)   “But since very few of the goals or goods that groups seek can accurately be 
described  as  pure  public  goods”  (Hardin  1982:19),  the  central  focus  of  the  dilemma  research  tends  to  be  on  goods  
where exclusion is not feasible (Olson 1965), rather than those with ideal or perfect jointness (Samuelson 1954). 
 
6 The   solution   is   ‘stable’   because   defection   is   the   dominant   strategy   for   every   actor   in   any   situation.   “One  
strategy is said to dominate another if the first strategy always yields a payoff at least as good and sometimes 
better  than  the  second,  no  matter  what  any  other  player  does.”  (Hardin  1982:24) 
7 
hypothesis7 (Brubaker 1975) universally predicts failure of collective action: no good will 
be  provided,  nobody  benefits,  and  “the  individual is worse off than if everyone (himself 
included)  contributed.”  (Marwell  and  Ames  1979:1338)        
 Although the provision of public goods poses a conflict between individual and 
collective interests (Messick and Brewer 1983), a large literature suggests that groups are 
able to overcome this tension to a much greater extent than is predicted by the rationally 
self-interested actor model (Marwell and Ames 1979, 1981; Ledyard 1995; Ostrom 1990, 
1998.)  
2.2 THE FEATURE OF PASSIVE CONSUMPTION 
Social scientists have up to now frequently assumed that actors consume Public Goods 
passively: “where  a  good  is  characterized  by  jointness  of  consumption  and  non-exclusion, 
a user is generally unable to exercise an option and has little choice whether or not to 
consume”   (Ostrom   and   Ostrom   1999:79). This makes intuitive sense for many Public 
Goods such as national security or clean air: one can neither be excluded by others, nor 
can one voluntarily exclude oneself from enjoying the benefits of peace or clean air.    
 “As we will see, there are as many variations in procedures and treatments [of 
public  good  experiments]  as  there  are  research  groups”  (Ledyard  1995:2);;  yet,  almost  all  
experiments   share   the   feature   of   passive   consumption.   Modeled   as   “give-some 
dilemmas”  (Dawes 1980), games are designed to replicate the basic features of real world 
social dilemmas in the laboratory by modeling a structural conflict between individual 
and collective rationality. Most commonly, this is achieved by establishing fixed payoff 
preferences resembling a N-Person  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  where  for  each  actor  DC  >  CC  >  
                                                          
7  Free riding is not always the same as defection since in case of universal defection (DD is predicted) there is 
no one on which to free-ride.  
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DD > CD.                               
 In  the  basic  or  ‘standard  version’  of  the  public  good  game8 each actor i in a group 
of n people is asked how much (if any) xi of an initial monetary endowment ℇ in his/her 
“private  account”  he  or  she  would  like  to  contribute  to  a  “group/public  account”.  While  
any amount an actor keeps in his/her private account (ℇ - xi) initially belongs to him/her, 
all (if any) contributions to the group account 
n
i=1∑  (xi) get multiplied by a factor α (with 
1 < α  <  n)  and are then equally divided by n. Finally, each actor i’s personal share from 
the group account  is “paid to i based on the choices of x1, ... , xn .”  9 (Ledyard 1995:9, 
emphasis mine.) Said differently, in the standard model each actor automatically receives 
his/her equal personal share  of the group account or public good: passive consumption is 
a ubiquitous feature of public goods experiments.      
 At this point of my analysis, an important distinction must be made. Although the 
design presented above is the most widely used in public good studies, not all researchers 
have assumed that each actor will benefit equally from the provision of a collective good 
(see Hardin 1982:67-90). Already Olson (1965) noted that certain   “privileged”  
actors/groups might benefit more from certain public goods than others. Hence, many 
                                                          
8 This is what Ledyard  (1995:8)  refers  to  as  “simple  environments  with  public  goods.” 
 
9 Imagine a five person  public good dilemma game with initial endowments of 10 tokens per actor and α=2. 
Each actor profits maximally in the case of his/her defection and the maximum cooperation of all other group 
members (DC). Here, the returned public good share for each actor would equal 16 tokens (10 tokens*4*2/5). 
That is to say, the final outcome for the defector would be 26 tokens (10 in private account + 16 public good 
share), and for each cooperator 16 tokens (0 in private account + 16 public good share). If everyone contributes 
the entire endowment to the public account (CC), each actor will receive a personal share of 20 tokens, that is to 
say, the initial endowment will have been doubled (public good share: 10 tokens*5*2/5=20 tokens). However, if 
all actors keep their entire endowments without contributing anything (DD), the good will not be created and 
each actor will be left with his/her initial endowment of 10 tokens (public good share: 0 tokens*5*2/5=0 tokens). 
The worst case scenario for ego is ending up as the only full contributor in a group of free riders. CD is simply 
the reverse case of DC (i.e., ego ends up with the simple public good share of 16 tokens, while all others finish 
with an additional 10 tokens kept in their private accounts (=26 tokens).  
9 
past public good studies have modeled heterogeneous groups via asymmetrical 
endowments/payoff functions among actors (e.g. Isaac et al. 1985; Marwell and Ames 
1981; Oliver et al. 1985; van Dijk and Grodzka 1992; van Dijk and Wilke 1993). 
Importantly, however, all these studies still shared the feature of passive consumption. 
That is to say, although some actors benefitted at different rates than others, benefitting 
itself occurred exclusively in a passive way via automatic distribution of the Public Good.  
 Thus, for the remainder, my research will be solely concerned with the type of 
public good consumption (i.e., the way one benefits from a good: passively or actively), 
and not the symmetry of public good consumption (e.g., whether every actor benefits at 
equal rates or not.) To conlcude, passive consumption is a ubiquitous feature of public 
goods experiments. In the chaper to follow, I will introduce a new consumption type: 
active consumption. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THEORY 
3.1 INTRODUCING ACTIVE CONSUMPTION 
In contrast to passively, or automatically, consumed public goods, those which must be 
actively consumed provide actors only with a consumption potential. That is to say, 
although every actor has access to such a good (exclusion is infeasible), whether and how 
much an actor actually receives of his or her share depends on a (more or less) active 
consumption decision. Real world examples of public goods that, once produced, must be 
actively   consumed   abound:  NPR,   public   parks   or   gardens,   public   transportation,   “open  
content”  such  as  Wikipedia,  public  supply  of  clean  water,  health  care  revolutions  such  as  
the Polio vaccination in 1950/60s America, or civil rights such as the right to vote or 
marry for formerly excluded groups.                        
 For an illustration, imagine a Public Good such as NPR. Though no actor can be 
excluded   from  benefitting   from  NPR’s  programming,  or  diminish  other   actors’  utilities 
when listening, no actor consumes the public good passively (i.e., by doing nothing), but 
only by active consumption (i.e., by deciding whether and how often to listen to NPR). 
Likewise, to take up the example of gay marriage, the provision of the public good (i..e, 
the right to marry with all related civil benefits) does not result in every gay or lesbian 
couple actually using these benefits. To benefit from the right (which is, as said earlier, 
an available potential), one still needs to make an active decision to get married. A 
11 
similar case can be made for a city which provides its citizens with the collective good of 
clean water (note that here the public good is water quality, not the water itself). Unlike 
clean air, the benefits from clean water for any person can only be derived via active 
consumption.                                            
 At this point of our investigation, a central question must be posed: given the 
identified qualitative differences between actively and passively consumed public goods, 
what will be the implications for the theory of public goods (which up to now has only 
treated passive consumption)? I will proceed to the main argument of my thesis: public 
goods which must be actively consumed will be provided at higher levels than those 
passively consumed. Because of that, I will claim that past experiments have exaggerated 
the extent to which public goods will be underprovided. 
 
3.2 THE SHADOW OF CONSUMPTION10 
Figure 3.1 illustrates how settings of passive consumption treat Stage II (by definition) 
identical to Stage III (i.e., the share of a public good is necessarily the amount passively 
consumed), while in settings of active consumption the two stages are distinct: here, 
Stage II is framed only as a consumption potential which is subject to a distinct active 
consumption choice in the subsequent stage. My main argument states that actors who 
are anticipating an active consumption of a public good will contribute significantly 
more to the production of a public good than actors who are anticipating passive 
consumption.            
                                                          
10 The scope conditions of my initial theoretical model encompass typical public good scenarios in which the 
production of a Public Good is jeopardized by a tension between individual and collective rationality (see 
Appendix A). 
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Basic model                                       New model 
                Passive Consumption                         Active Consumption 
 
 
     Behavioral options               TYPE (Example)           Behavioral options 
              Stage I                CHOICE (ACTIVE)             CONTRIBUTION             CHOICE (ACTIVE) 
               (Contributing to group defense)                                            (Donating to NPR) 
 
 
   Stage II        NO CHOICE (PASSIVE)       SHARE OF BENEFIT    NO CHOICE (PASSIVE) 
                (Successful group defense)                                         (NPR continues to broadcast) 
 
 
             Stage III     NO CHOICE (PASSIVE)                CONSUMPTION              CHOICE (ACTIVE) 
              (Benefitting from group defense)                                       (Enjoying  NPR’s  program) 
 
     
    Figure 3.1 Behavioral options in two models: passive vs. active consumption.
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I claim that passive consumption of a public good is analogous to inaction, or 
omission, while active consumption is analogous to action, or commission. I build on 
social psychological research which has shown that actions/commissions are generally 
attributed higher levels of responsibility and intentionality, are more harshly judged, and 
are generally more visible and salient (both for actors and observers) than 
inactions/omissions. Specifically, it has been found that commissions elicit higher rates 
of affective reactions in humans than omissions (Zeelenberg et al. 2000). This is based on 
attributions of more responsibility/intentionality for actions/commissions than 
inactions/omissions (e.g. Kordes-de Vaal 1996). Moreover, actions/commissions that lead 
to a positive outcome are praised significantly more than inactions/omission leading to 
the same positive outcome. Similar effects hold for negative outcomes: here, too, actions 
are blamed significantly more than inactions, even if the two lead to the same outcome 
(Baron and Ritov 1994; Malle and Bennett 2002).                                         
 A recent study by de Scioli et al. (2011) found that actors who obtained a morally 
questionable outcome via omission were judged less severely by observers than those 
who obtained the same outcome via commission. More importantly, the authors reported 
that when people were able to realize self-serving – and other-harming outcomes either 
through  omission  or  commission,  they  tended  to  opt  for  omission:  “These  results  provide  
evidence for a specific causal relationship in which reduced condemnation of omissions 
causes  people  to  choose  omissions  as  a  strategic  response”  (de  Scioli  et  al.  2011:445).   
 The dichotomy between omission vs. commission parallels settings of passive vs. 
active consumption of Public Goods. I thus suggest that free riders in the former benefit 
from more behavioral leeway and ambiguity than the latter. Said differently, while in the 
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passive model self-interested actors only need to withhold contributions in the first stage 
in order to free ride (and then benefit passively), narrowly rational actors in the active 
model need to make an additional active choice in the third stage. Besides making this 
choice actively (signaling intentionality of and responsibility for the act), free riders also 
need to consume the maximum in order to benefit most.               
  I claim that two distinctly intentional actions in settings of active consumption 
significantly increase the likelihood of being morally condemned as a free rider based on 
i)  lower  behavioral  ambiguity,  ii)  heightened  salience  of  one’s  actions,  and  iii)  heightened  
sensitivity for fairness and justice (compared to passive settings where consumption 
happens automatically.) Further reasons to expect that free-riders on public goods that 
must be actively consumed will be viewed more negatively come from a study by Delton 
et al. (2012). Across several situational vignettes the authors tested different free rider-
detection   models   and   found   that   “failure   to   contribute   is   not sufficient. Failure to 
contribute can occur by intention or accident, but the adaptive threat is posed by those 
who  are  motivated  to  benefit  themselves  at  the  expense  of  cooperators.”  (1252,  emphasis 
mine)            
 They   concluded   that   “the   human   mind does not equate free rides with under-
contribution, nor does it lump free riders into a general category that contains all moral 
violators. Instead, (...) the mind classifies individuals as free riders only when their 
behavior indicates they have a psychological design or calibration that causes them to 
consume benefits while withholding contributions (1267, emphasis mine). This is the 
strategy narrowly rational actors should pursue in settings of active consumption (i.e., 
zero contribution + max. consumption).            
 15 
 
 
 However, as emphasized earlier, active consumption settings allow for much a 
greater   visibility   and   attribution   of   intentionality   of   one’s   actions   because   of   two  
decisions which are made actively: contribution and consumption (compared to only 
active contribution in passive settings. To conclude, I claim that free riding in the active 
setting will be judged more unfairly than in the passive setting, even when the exact same 
self-serving outcome is realized. 
 
Hypothesis 1: Low contributors who actively consume the maximum personal available 
amounts of a public good will be judged as acting less fair than low contributors who 
passively consume the same amount of a public good. 
 
If we can infer that the two types of consumption (passive vs. active) elicit significantly 
different   attributions  of   free   riders’   fairness   and  morality  by   observers, we should also 
expect that actors themselves will be aware of that and make strategic choices in order to 
minimize   others’   negative   judgments.   “We   infer   that the preference for omission is 
strategic: People choose omissions to avoid third-party  condemnation  and  punishment.”  
(de Scioli et al. 2012:445) I hypothesize a similar strategic behavior when actors are able 
to determine the type of consumption setting (active vs. passive).    
 In the following hypothesis, I define a sucker as one who contributes a lot while 
his or her fellow group members contribute very little. I define a free-rider as someone 
who contributes very little while his fellow group members contribute a lot. I argue that 
suckers  will  prefer  active  consumption   in  order   to  bring  others’  moral   transgressions   to  
16 
 
attention, and to increase the likelihood of fair consumption. That is to say, suckers will 
hope that low contributors will consume less than the maximum available benefit. Free-
riders, on the other hand, will prefer passive consumption of public goods, in order to 
mitigate  the  severity  of  others’  judgments.   
 
Hypothesis 2: Suckers will tend to prefer a public good that is actively consumed 
whereas free-riders will tend to prefer a public good that is passively consumed. 
 
My final hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Contributions will be significantly higher in settings where Public Goods 
are actively consumed compared to settings where they are consumed passively. 
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CHAPTER 4 
METHODS 
Design and Participants  
The experiment was a randomized two condition within-subjects design which exposed 
all participants to both types of consumption (active vs. passive). The main between-
subjects factor was order of exposure (active consumption first vs. passive consumption 
first). Participants were recruited from a large public university in the southeastern US. A 
total of 59 participants (66% female) took part in the study.  
 
Procedure  
After arriving at the laboratory, participants were individually seated in separate isolation 
rooms to rule out communication among each other. Participants were informed that they 
would never meet other participants and that their identity would not be revealed at any 
time during, or after the study. Participants were informed that all decisions would be 
made via networked computers. Instructions informed them that they would work with 
four other participants on a group task, and that their final earnings would be determined 
by   their   own   and   others’   decisions.   In   reality,   participants   interacted   with   simulated  
others whose behavior was preprogrammed. 
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Public Good Dilemma – Contribution Part 
Participants read the contribution instructions for a typical Give-some Dilemma (see, e.g., 
Willer   2009).   Subjects   were   told   that   each   player   had   a   “private   account”   which   was  
endowed with 10 tokens. Tokens translated into a distinct monetary value, unknown to 
participants.  Anything  in  each  actor’s  private  account  was  his/hers.  Participants were then 
informed  that  there  was  a  second  account  called  “public  account”  and  that  they  would  be  
asked to make a decision about how much of their private endowment to contribute to the 
public account. Each token was displayed as a small money bag, and had to be 
transferred separately via drag-and-drop. Finally, participants were told that all tokens 
contributed to the public account would be doubled by the computer.  
                         
Manipulation of Active vs. Passive Consumption.  
I now introduce the main manipulation (passive vs. active consumption).   
A. Participants in the control condition (passive first) continued to read the (passive) 
consumption instructions of typical Public Good Games. Players were informed that the 
doubled public account would be divided equally among all five group members. That is 
to say, each participant was informed that he or she would receive 1/5 (20%) of tokens 
from the doubled public account, regardless of how much she had contributed. 
B. Participants in the treatment condition (active first) continued to read the (active) 
consumption instructions for the modified Public Good Game.11 Players were informed 
                                                          
11 To the best of my knowledge, this design was introduced by Parks and Stone (2010). However, while the 
authors’  main dependent variable was the expulsion of group members who all made active consumption 
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that once the public account was doubled, every member of the group was allowed to 
take up to 1/5 (20%) of tokens from the group account, regardless of how much she had 
contributed.12 Specifically, actors had to transfer the tokens they wanted to consume from 
the public into their private accounts. Each token was displayed as a little money bag, and 
had to be transferred separately via drag-and-drop. This measure was chosen to increase 
the   salience   (and   manipulation)   of   “active   consumption”,   i.e.,   consumption   involved  
effort, unlike typing a choice into a text-box. In order to elicit anticipation of maximum 
consumption   participants   were   told   that   any   tokens   not   transferred   to   one’s   private  
account in one round would go away (i.e., they would not be transferred to the next 
round). This helped ensure that, in both conditions, participants would always anticipate 
maximum consumption.                                         
 The two conditions posed exactly the same social dilemma. Each actor knew that 
everyone would benefit most in case all contributed their entire endowments (collective 
rationality). Similarly, I made sure to underscore that each actor in the passive 
consumption setting would always consume exactly 1/5 of the group account,  while 
those in the active setting would have the potential to consume up to exactly 1/5 of the 
group account, regardless of individual contributions. Participants expected to play 
several rounds of the same game without being told how many.                
 Furthermore,   the   instructions   stated   that   their   and   all   others’   choices   would   be  
                                                                                                                                                                             
decisions, the main dependent variable in the present research is the amount of contributions to a public good in 
active vs. passive settings. 
 
12 Of course an actor can only contribute anything from zero up to his/her total endowment in the contribution 
phase, and likewise actively consume only anything from zero up to his/her total personal share of the public 
good (=20%) in the second phase. Thus, the public good remains non-rival. For example, if in a group of 5, all 
members contribute all 10 tokens, the doubled group account would consist of (5*10)*2=100 tokens. This 
amount will then be divided equally among all: 100 tokens / 5 = 20 tokens. However, while the basic model 
would automatically allocate all 20 tokens to each participant, the new design gives participants the choice to 
consume anything from 0 up to the maximum of (here) 20 tokens. 
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publicly displayed after each round on the computer screens. Participants were told that 
they  would  only  be  distinguishable  from  each  other  via  the  random  assignment  of  “group  
member   IDs”.   Finally,   a   quiz   was   administered   in   both   conditions   to   make   sure  
participants had understood the basic features of the social dilemma, and to further 
reinforce the manipulations.  
 
First and Second Decisions [Test of Hypothesis 3] 
Before   the   beginning   of   the   first   round,   actors   were   allegedly   “randomly   assigned”   a  
group member ID by the computer. In reality, in the first two rounds participants in both 
conditions were always assigned to be member #2. Participants then went on to make 
active contribution decisions. Across conditions, participants were given the same 
simulated   feedback   of   “alters’”   contribution   decisions, while their own choices were 
displayed, under their group member ID (see Appendix B). However, while in the passive 
consumption condition the feedback already contained the consumption output (no 
choice), participants in the active consumption condition went on to the subsequent 
consumption choice.          
 After that, a final feedback table was presented, now showing both the real 
consumption  choice  for  ego,  while  presenting  false  feedback  about  others’  consumption  
decisions. Because consumption below the maximum was non-rational (i..e, not 
consumed tokens could not be consumed in subsequent rounds), each simulated alter 
always consumed the maximum possible. In round two the basic procedure of round one 
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was repeated. Upon completion of the second round, subjects were told that they would 
now be working on a different group task with a different group of four others. 
Within Manipulations – Consumption Part (second order) 
I then introduced the manipulation by simply switching type of consumption. That is to 
say, subjects who started in the passive consumption condition were introduced to the 
active consumption manipulation, and vice versa. Except for subjects anticipating to 
work with a different group of people for the following rounds, everything else remained 
constant (i.e., anticipation of several rounds, etc.). Again, a quiz was administered 
checking for the understanding of the altered procedures. 
 
Third and Fourth Decisions 
Before the beginning of the third round,  participants  were   again   allegedly   “randomly 
assigned”  a  group  member  ID  by  the  computer.  In  reality,  in  the  third  and  fourth  round  
participants in both conditions were always assigned to be member #5. Participants then 
went on to make active contribution decisions. Members across conditions were given the 
same   simulated   feedback   of   “alters’”   contribution   decisions,   while   their   own   choices  
were displayed, under their group member ID. The basic procedure from round one and 
two was repeated. That is, the behavioral component of the study ended with the fourth 
public goods game. 
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Free Rider Questionnaire [Test of Hypothesis 1] 
After the behavioral part of the study, participants were asked to compare and rank two 
members   of   two   different   “hypothetical   groups”   on   a   single   dimension:   fairness.   The  
hypothetical scenario I constructed consisted of two five person groups. The two groups 
were distinguished by whether the type of public good they produced was actively or 
passively consumed. In both groups, the focal member contributed 2 tokens (out of 10) to 
the group fund. The group member in the active consumption setting then consumed the 
maximum of 12 tokens. The group member in the passive setting received the same 
amount   automatically.   Participants   were   then   asked   to   rate   “which   person   acted  more  
unfairly”  on  a  7-Item Likert Scale (see Appendix C.) 
 
Strategic Choice Questionnaire [Test of  Hypothesis 2] 
In a final task, participants were again presented with hypothetical feedback tables  
showing the ostensive contributions of a single group of five actors to the group fund. 
Participants were asked to imagine being a specific group member (group member #5). In 
one scenario, group member #5 was a sucker (i.e., the sole high contributor (10 tokens) in 
a group of low contributors [all 3 tokens]), while in a second scenario group member #5 
was a free-rider (i..e, the sole low contributor (3 tokens) in a group of high contributors 
[all 10 tokens]). This was the main manipulation (ego was the sucker vs. the free rider in 
the contribution phase). Participants were exposed to both scenarios in random order. For 
each scenario, they were then asked whether they would prefer the public good to be of 
the actively or passively consumed type:  
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Version X: After group fund is doubled, every member automatically gets added 1/5 of 
tokens from the group account to his/her private account by the computer. 
Version Y: After group fund is doubled, every member can take any amount from 0 up to 
1/5  of  tokens  from  the  group  account  and  transfer  to  his/her  private  account.” 
While version X resembled the passive consumption setting (automatic reception of 
tokens from the group account), version Y resembled the active consumption setting 
(active consumption of tokens from the group account). 
This concluded the study. Subjects were then all paid the same amount ($8), checked for 
suspicion, thoroughly debriefed, thanked, and dismissed. The entire study lasted less than 
45 minutes.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS 
 
Hypothesis 1 
A one-sample t-test of the fairness ranking between a free rider in a passive and an active 
setting  yielded  a  mean  of  3.17  (SD  =  1.3),  significantly  below  the  midpoint  (‘both  actors  
equally   unfair’   -- p < .001, one-tailed). This confirms my first hypothesis: Low 
contributors who extract the maximum available benefit (i.e., free riders in active 
settings) are judged as acting less fairly than low contributors who automatically receive 
the very same amount (i.e., free riders in passive settings.) 
 
Hypothesis 2  
I claimed that free-riders and suckers would express opposite preferences for passive vs. 
active consumption. Results are in line with my hypothesis: while more participants 
(58%) chose active over passive consumption when they were in the role of a sucker, this 
pattern was reversed when participants were in the role of free-rider, where a majority 
(61%) preferred passive to active consumption. I ran a related samples McNemar test to 
check whether the responses in the two samples differ significantly from each other. The 
result was significant (p < .013). 
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Hypothesis 3  
My main hypothesis states that participants in active settings will contribute significantly 
more than those in passive settings. Because participants played a total of four rounds of 
the public good game (two rounds in the active and two rounds in the passive setting, in 
different order), I aggregated the first and second contribution decisions in both the active 
and passive settings. Results are clearly in line with my predictions.   
 Paired sample t-tests comparing first decisions in active vs. passive settings show 
that participants contributed significantly more to the public good in the active 
consumption condition (MActive 1 = 7.02 vs. MPassive 1 = 6.05, p < .048).          
Contributions in the second round of each condition also showed higher contributions in 
the active consumption condition (MActive 2 = 8.20 vs. MPassive 2 = 6.97, p < .003). 
Additional analyses employing repeated measures ANOVA showed no main effect of 
order, and additionally confirm the results of the above analysis (for all first decisions: F 
= 4.207, p < .045, for all second decisions: F = 9.817, p < .003). Together, these results 
provide support for my central hypothesis: anticipating the active consumption of public 
goods increases contributions to them (see Figure 5.1.) 
26 
 
          
        Figure 5.1 Aggregated contributions in first and second decisions. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
The  results  reported  above  support  my  central  ‘shadow  of  consumption’  argument:  those  
public goods which must be actively consumed will be provided at higher levels than 
those that are passively consumed. I present several types of evidence: attitudinal data 
(hypothesis 1) indicates that free riders in active settings are judged more negatively than 
free riders in passive settings; reported preferences (hypothesis 2) suggest that 
participants strategically chose active vs. passive consumption, depending on whether 
they were in the role of a sucker or free-rider. Finally, I present actual behavioral data 
(hypothesis 3): participants contributed significantly more to the public good when they 
anticipated an active consumption decision than when they expected that the public good 
would be automatically redistributed. This study thus provides the first evidence that 
passively consumed public goods differ in important ways from those that are actively 
consumed.                    
 The current work extends research on the provision of public goods in a number 
of ways. First, prior work has not addressed how anticipated consumption serves as an 
independent predictor  of  collective  action.  As  a  result,  I’ve  argued,  the  standard  approach  
to the study of public goods systematically overestimates the level of free-riding that 
occurs in the provision of many public goods. Second, the results suggest that the 
consumption of public goods is of greater theoretical significance in explaining public 
good provision (and maintenance) than research up to now has assumed. Finally, the 
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results suggest that, all other things equal, public goods that must be consumed actively 
will tend to be provided at higher levels than those that are passively consumed. In most 
cases, whether a good is consumed actively or passively is determined solely be the 
nature of the good. In other cases, however, policy makers might be able to implement an 
active decision component into the public goods consumption. My results suggest that 
such action would increase provision of the public good.   
 
Directions for future studies 
Before concluding, I outline several directions for future work on the shadow of 
consumption  hypothesis.  First,  it  is  important  to  address  the  ‘shadow  of  consumption‘  in  
dynamic collective action groups, where participants interact over multiple rounds with 
real – versus simulated others. Results from the existing study are promising in this 
regard.  While   participants’   contribution   level   plummeted   sharply  when   switching   from  
active to passive consumption settings, the level of those entering the active setting (from 
passive environments) remained constant and even increased (see Figure D.1, which 
displays the results prior to aggregation.)                    
 Secondly,   the   present   research   only   investigated   participants’   attitudes towards 
hypothetical free-riders. As hypothesized, participants judged free riders in active settings 
more harshly than those in passive environments, despite the fact that they benefited 
equally. Can we expect higher levels of (costly) punishment of free-riders in active- 
versus passive-consumption settings?                   
 Finally, future studies should address who is driving the surge in cooperation 
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levels from passive to active settings. I suggest that analyzing the interaction of social 
value orientation (Au and Kwong 2004; Balliet et al. 2009; Liebrand 1986; van Lange 
1999) with contribution behavior in passive vs. active settings will be a promising 
approach. Drawing on research looking at the interaction of person and situation in 
prosocial behavior (Simpson and Willer 2008; Willer et al. 2013) I argue that more self-
interested actors will be most affected  by  the  ‘shadow  of  consumption.’  This  is  because  
of the increased scrutiny of actions in active active (vs. passive) consumption settings. 
Already having observed that the two consumption types elicit different cooperation 
levels, a future demonstration   that   “egoists”   tend   to   contribute   at   rates  more   similar   to  
“prosocials”  in  active  consumption  settings  would  be  important  as  a  key   issue  in  public  
goods research in unfairness (Schroeder et al. 2003). 
 
Conclusion 
The main point of departure for the present study was the following observation: despite 
many variations on the standard design in public goods experiments, nearly all of them 
share the feature of passive consumption. I suggested that the automatic distribution of 
benefits design, in which each group member automatically receives his or her share of 
the public good, systematically under-represents many real world public goods which 
must be actively consumed.                                           
 I developed the main ‘shadow   of   consumption’ hypothesis: actively consumed 
public goods are more likely to be provided, or provided at a higher level, than those that 
are passively consumed. Specifically, I proposed that actors who anticipate the active 
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consumption of a public good will contribute significantly more to its provision than 
those who anticipate passive consumption, as is the case in the standard public goods 
design used up to now. The results of a new experiment fully support my main 
hypothesis: the public good was provided at significantly higher levels when participants 
anticipated active consumption of the public good compared to passive consumption.   
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APPENDIX A – SCOPE CONDITIONS OF THE INITIAL MODEL 
1. The scope of the theory encompasses collective action situations involving the  
potential production of public goods which are                                                
1a. non-excludable and subject to joint consumption,             
1b. valued by all members of the group, and                  
1c. require costly contributions from members of the group to be produced. 
2. On any given trial, there are two distinct choices to be made by each actor, linked to 
two distinct points of measurement, which are to occur in the following sequence:          
2a. at t(+1): Contribution choice towards the provision of a public good, and             
2b.  at  t(+2):  Consumption  choice  towards  the  consumption  of  a  public  good’s  joint  
benefits.                        
2c. Actors need to share a common anticipation of [2a] and [2b] to occur at outset t(0). 
3a. Each actor has equal access to the same amount of a public good (jointness of 
consumption), from which he/she can only benefit if the public good is actively 
consumed (i.e., extracted).                                        
3b. Each actor may or may not consume (i.e., extract) any amount from zero to the 
maximum of his/her personal share of the public good in units of one.                                     
3c. Anything not consumed (i.e., extracted) at t(+2) will not be consumable in the future. 
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4a. On any given trial, a person benefits most by both withholding contributions and 
extracting the maximum possible amount of personal benefit, and                                    
4b. if all withhold contributions all will be worse off. 
5. On  any  given  trial,  each  actor  can  see  each  other  actor’s  decisions.
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APPENDIX B – SIMULATED FEEDBACK OF ALTERS’ CONTRIBUTIONS 
          Table B.1 Simulated Feedback: alter contributions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision Individual  
Alter contributions 
Total  
Alter contributions 
(without ego) 
SD 
1st 8-ego-7-10-7 32 1.4 
2nd 7-ego-7-9-6  29 1.3 
             Introduction  of  within  manipulation  
3rd 8-10-8-6-ego 32 1.6 
4th 6-10-7-6-ego 29 1.9 
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                                        Table B.2 Simulated Feedback: payoff range. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decision Lowest-Highest  
Total Contribution  
(ego 0 - 10) 
Lowest-Highest 
Total Contribution 
(doubled) 
Possible Payoff 
Range 
for ego 
1st 32 - 42 64 - 84 13 - 17 
2nd 29 - 39 58 - 78 12 - 16 
             Introduction  of  within manipulation  
3rd 32 - 42 64 - 84 13 - 17 
4th 29 - 39 58 - 78 12 - 16 
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APPENDIX C – FREE RIDER QUESTIONNAIRE                                                  
The answer categories were presented on a 7-Item Likert Scale: 
# 1 in Game A acted much more unfairly -- more unfairly -- slightly more unfairly 
than # 1 in Game B,     
# 1 in Game A and #1 in Game B acted equally unfairly,      
# 1 in Game B acted slightly more unfairly-- more unfairly -- much more unfairly 
than # 1 in Game A. 
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APPENDIX D – MEAN CONTRIBUTIONS OVER ALL FOUR ROUNDS 
 
                                                     Figure D.1 Mean Contributions over all four rounds. 
